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In the SttpreJlte Cottrt of the 
State of Utah 
AMY ELIZABETH McKEE 
OSTLER GREENER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THOMAS RICHARDSON GREENER 
and JAMES AITEN GREENER, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
) 
\ 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
CASE 
NO. 7265 
This is an appeal from the judgment and Decree of 
the Fourth District Court in favor of the defendant Thom-
as Richardson Greener, and against the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff filed suit against the defendant Thomas Rich-
::trdson Greener for divorce, and for the reinstatement of 
approximately $30,000 in funds that had been on deposit 
in certain banking institutions in the joint names of the 
plaintiff and the said defendant, but which funds had been 
withdrawn by the said defendant. (R, 2-5) 
Upon hearing on order to show cause (R, 9-10) it de- . · 
vel oped that the said defendant had removed said funds 
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and transferred them to his son, James Aften Greener. 
Thereupon an amended complaint was filed (R, 11-16) mak-
ing James Aften Greener and the Helper State Bank also 
parties defendant, and an order to show cause and tempor-
ary restraining order (R, 22-23) was issued and served 
upon each of the defendants (R, 20, 21, 23). The court, 
upon the hearing, dissolved the restraining order as to the 
Helper State Bank (R, 31), and dismissed the order to show 
cause (R, 32). Upon stipulation of the remaining parties 
(R, 32), a second amended complaint (R, 33-42) was filed 
against the defendants, Thomas Richardson Greener and 
Jam~ Aften Greener, and eight banks and saving and loan 
associations, all of whom were brought before the court on 
orders to show cause (R, 46-49) in an effort to restrain the 
latter from honoring checks which they had issued to the 
defendant James Aften Greener representing the sums of 
money that had theretofore stood in the joint accounts of 
the plaintiff and the defendant Thomas Richardson Green-
er, but had been transferred by him to the defendant James 
Aften Greener. The second amended complaint and re-
straining orders and all of the orders to show cause were 
dismissed as to all of the defendants except Thomas Rich-
ardson Greener and James Aften Greener (R, 131). An 
order of the court was subsequently made re11easing thq 
sum of $1,608.00 on deposit in the Springville Bank to the 
account of James Aften Greener, to Elmer L. Terry, one 
of counsel for the defendants, as trustee, for certain uses 
(R, 145-146). The balance of the sums withdrawn by 
James Aften Greener by means of checks as aforesaid was 
deposited under order of the court in time accounts in four 
separate banks in Utah County (R, 154). These accounts, 
approximating a total of $18,271.08 (R, 114) at the time of 
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deposit, have been reduced by the sums of $86.80, repre-
senting costs of transcript of proceedings in the District 
Court, and $250.00 attorneys' fees to plaintiff's counsel, 
to apply toward fees on appeal under order of the court 
(R, 165-166). 
In Plaintiff's second amended complaint she sues de-
fendant Thomas Richardson Greener for divorce on the 
grounds of cruelty, for alimony, court costs and attorneys' 
fees. She also claims a one-half interest in the funds trans-
ferred by Thomas Richardson Greener to James Aften 
Greener, and alleges that the transfer was fraudulent as 
to her, both as to her one-half interest and· to the balance 
of the fimd as well. She seeks to set aside said transfer 
of funds, and to have herself declared the absolute owner 
of one-half of said ftmds and of such further amount there-
of as she may be entitled to by reason of her marital rights 
therein (R, 33-42). 
An answer, apparently on behalf of both defendants, 
Thomas Richardson Greener and James Aften Greener, 
and a cross complaint on l?ehalf of the former w~re . filed 
(R, 105-108). Plaintiff filed her reply to the cross com-
plaint and counterclaim (R, 109-110). 
After hearing, the court issued its memorandum of 
dfcision (R. 115-124), made its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law (R, 147-151) and entered its Decree on Au-
gust 26, 1948, denying the plaintiff a divorce, and holding 
that the funds in question are the sole funds of the defend-
ant Thomas Richardson Greener, and are being held in 
trust by the defendant James Aften Greener for the .use 
and benefit of the said Thomas Richardson Greener,· and 
ordering the release of the funds to the said James Aften 
Greener (R, 152). On August 27, 1948, the order here-
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tofore mentioned regarding the deposit of the funds with 
the various banks in Utah -County was issued (R, 154). 
Notice of appeal (R, 161) was served on defendants' 
counsel on October 22, 1948, and with an affidavit of im-
pecuniosity (R, 162) was filed by the plaintiff with the 
court on the same date. No cross-appeal has been filed by 
either of the defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff herein, a woman of the age of 65 years 
(Tr. 40) , prior to her marriage to the defendant, Thomas 
Richardson Greener (hereinafter sometimes referred to as 
"Greener") on the 2nd day of October, 1946 (Tr. 10) was 
a widow living at Springville, Utah. She had been mar-
ried once before, but her first husband had died some ten 
years before her marriage to Greener (Tr. 42-43). Prior 
to her marriage to Greener she had a home in Springville 
and was drawing an old age pension (Tr. 47-48). 
Some time prior to his marriage to the plaintiff the 
defendant Greener (who will be 81 years old on January 
13, 1949 (Tr. 112) approached one Agnes Rowland a sis-
ter-in-law of the plaintiff, inquired of her what kind of a 
woman the plaintiff was, and asked her if she thought the 
plaintiff would get married; that he was lonesome and wan-
ted someone to keep house for him. Mrs. Rowland indica-
ted that, "as far as her getting married, I don't know any-
thing about that, but . . . as far as I know she is a 
good woman." Greener then asked Mrs. Rowland to see 
and talk to the plaintiff and to ask her how she felt about 
it. He then volunteered to Mrs. Rowland that, "Some peo-
ple think I have got forty thousand dollars, but I haven't 
got that much. But I have got enough to keep her for the 
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rest of her days. And one thing she will never have to go 
on the old age pension." The next morning he returned 
and said, "1\irs. Rowland, you can make that as big as you 
want, and I will make it good." (Tr. 5-6). This informa-
tion was conveyed by Mrs. Rowland to the plaintiff, who 
informed her to tell Greener "to do his own courting" (Tr. 
6, 12). 
This information having been relayed back to Greener, 
he called on the plaintiff and asked her if she wanted to 
get married, telling her that he was lonesome and needed 
someone with him and wanted to know if she would marry 
- him. She told him that she would have to think it over. 
In the course of their conversation, among other things, 
he told her that he had thirty thousand dollars in money, 
t~vo thousand dollars in bonds, five hundred dollars which 
a son owed him, and five hundred dollars that two grand-
sons owed him. He told her that she "could have all that 
and everything he had, and the old man thrown in with it 
if [she] would have him" (Tr. 13.) He visited her daily aft-
er that (Tr. 9), and repeated his pron1ises "all over again 
if [she] would have him" (Tr. 14). About two weeks after 
the first visit they decided to marry, and Greener made 
the promises again and told her that they would go to Salt 
Lake and Provo to banks in which his money was deposited 
and have her name entered on the accounts, so that she 
would be just as much owner of the money as he was. Aft-
. er the marriage they went together to the banks and sav-
ings and loan companies, where they signed joint account 
. ~greements at each institution. (Tr. 15-16, Stip. of Fact, 
R. 112-114, Exhibits A, B, C, D, and I). Passbooks were 
then issued by the depositories in the names of Thomas R. 
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Greener or Amy E. Greener. (Stip. of Fact, R, 112, Tr. 
18, 201). 
After their marriage plaintiff and Greener got along 
well until they had a visit from one of the sons of the lat-
ter, who, during the course of the conversation between 
the son, Greener and the plaintiff, said that he didn't see 
why his father married the plaintiff, to step in and take 
his mother's place and have the money. (Tr. 19). The son 
also stated that he would see that the plaintiff didn't get 
a penny of the money. Shortly thereafter, Greener asked 
the plaintiff if she would get a divorce, saying that if she 
would "maybe his children would come back to him and 
treat him decent again." They conversed as to the amount 
of money the plaintiff should have, and settled on the sum 
of $2,000. They then went to the offices of Roylance and 
Terry (Tr. 79) who represented Mrs. Greener in filing suit 
for divorce. It was difficult for counsel to find grounds. 
None was found for the defendant, and the action was thus 
filed ·by the plaintiff here, alleging impotency of Greener, 
and a decree was entered on December 19, 1946 (Tr. 23, 
R, 148-149). Plaintiff received the sum of $2,000, and went 
with the defendant to Salt Lake, where her name was with-
drawn as joint tenant from all of the accounts in the de-
positories. (R, 113, 149). Plaintiff used the $2,000 in re-
modeling her own home, etc. (R, 149, Tr. 188-192). 
Not long after the entry qf the decree (a week, or per-
haps a little longer) Greener asked the plaintiff to return 
to him. He visited her every day at her home, and renewed 
his requests that she return to him, and promised her over 
and over that if she would return she could have all the 
money in the bank accounts, his home, everything he had 
and the old man thrown in with it. He promised to go with 
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her again and have the bank accounts reestablished in their 
joint names. Plaintiff did not immediately accept. In the 
meantime, she was offered a position at the County In-
finnary at $110.00 per month, which Greener begged her 
not to accept, offering to give her instead $150.00 per 
month. Plaintiff refused the $150.00 per month, and there-
after Greener "kept coming and wanting me to go back to 
him", and made the smne promises over again as to her 
having the money and property and reinstating her as joint 
owner of the accounts. (Tr. 23-25). Defendant also solici-
ted the aid of various 1nembers of the plaintiff's family by 
her former marriage to intercede with plaintiff in his be-
half. (Tr. 66, 71, 73). He told plaintiff's daughter-in-law, 
Leora B. Ostler, on one occasion that "he would make sure 
she [plaintiff] didn't have to want for money"; that "he 
would give her $150.00 and he would go further than that 
if he had to." (Tr. 62). One day, in the presence of Mrs. 
Ostler, while defendant was sitting in the front room of 
plaintiff's home talking to the plaintiff, he said that "if 
she [plaintiff] would come back to him he would give her 
all his property and all his money and the old man throwed 
in with it." (Tr. 63). Plaintiff finally agreed to return and 
live with the defendant upon the condition that he fulfill 
his promises made to her concerning his property and bank 
accounts (Tr. 25), and she would not have gone back to 
him at that time if he had not made the promises with re-
spect to his property and the money on deposit in the banks 
(Tr. 26). 
On April 3, 1947, plaintiff and defendant appeared in 
Court and requested that the Decree of Divorce be set aside 
and the action dismissed. Such was the order of the Court, 
and thereafter, on or about April 16, 1947, they went to 
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Salt Lake City, to the various depositories, signed agree-
ments, of which Exhibits "E', "F", "G", "H", and "I", re-
spectively, are true copies, and the sums of money then on 
deposit in the said depositories to the credit of Greener were 
transferred to accounts in the names of "Thomas R. Green-
er or Amy E. Greener" (Stip. R. 113, 149, Tr. 26-29, 201) 
and new passbooks in conformity therewith issued (Tr. 29, 
32-33, 107). On this latter occasion, after signing the 
agreements, the plaintiff, in the presence of Greener, veri-
fied at each depository the fact that she had then just as 
much right to the money and to write out check against it 
as Greener had (Tr. 28-32). It was Greener's understand-
ing, and he knew that during the times he and Mrs. Greener 
were on the joint accounts in the depositories both of them 
could draw on the accounts, and that there was no limita-
tion upon either of them doing so, and he never imposed 
any limitations in that respect (Tr. 146). Greener intended 
that Mrs. Greener should have the money during his life-
time, and should become, with him, part owner in the funds, 
and this was his intention when they returned to Salt Lake 
City after the divorce was set aside, and the agreements 
as to the funds were signed (Tr. 158-159). 
Soon after the reconciliation, difficulties again arose 
between the plaintiff and Greener (R, 149, Tr. 33). Green-
er kept demanding the return of the $2,000 plaintiff had 
taken on the divorce settlement, but she refused to return 
it (Tr. 34). This caused frequent quarrels between them 
(Tr. 37), and on several occasions Greener accused the 
plaintiff of robbing him of $2,000 (Tr. 34, 145). One of 
these occasions was at the hearing on the first order to 
show cause, in open court on law and motion day, in the 
presence of members of the Bar and others present in Court 
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(Tr. 199). On one of the occasions of the quarrels over 
the $2,000, Greener told the plaintiff he "might do some-
thing desperate," took the paring knife that was on the cup-
board and drew the back of the blade across plaintiff's 
throat and then, with a stabbing motion, hit her with the 
handle part over the heart (Tr. 33-34). On this occasion, 
plaintiff said to Greener, "Old man, you want to be damn 
sure you make a good job of it." Greener threatened the 
plaintiff many times, and said to her many times that he 
might do something desperate (Tr. 80). 
Although the plaintiff had never threatened to remove 
any part of the funds on deposit in the joint accounts (Tr. 
134, 203-204) , Greener had lain in the same bed with the 
plaintiff at night unable to sleep "wondering how in the 
devil I was going to get out of the net she had me in" (Tr. 
119), and studying how to get the plaintiff's name off the 
various bank accounts (Tr. 119, 138-139). He first deter-
mined to take her name off of the books " a few months 
before I done the job"; and because he "couldn't get away 
from her to do it, . . didn't want her there when I 
did it" and "didn't want her to know that I done it" he wai-
ted until she went to California in December, 1947, to do 
the job (Tr. 139). 
On this latter occasion, unknown to the plaintiff, and 
without her consent (Tr. 40), Greener went to the various 
depositories in which the joint accounts were located and 
had the funds on deposit in the joint accounts transferred 
to the sole account of his son, the defendant James Aften 
Greener (Stip. R, 113-114, Tr. 135). Greener testified that 
he gave the money to his son, James Aften Greener (Tr. 
198) absolutely (Tr. 196-197, 215), and with no thought in 
mind or any agreement that he could get any part of it 
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back if ·he wanted (Tr. 140, 204). The defendant James 
Aften Greener (hereinafter referred to as "Aften") testi-
fied at the show cause hearing of January 30, 1948, that 
his father "transferred the money into my name and told 
me he was giving me the money as a Christmas present" 
(Tr. 214), that it was given to Aften as his own and that 
nothing was said about returning it to the father (Tr. 214-
215). 
After the transfer of the funds to Aften, the defend-
ant Thomas Richardson Greener had no property other 
than his home (Tr. 112, 124), and no means whatever to 
support the plaintiff (Tr. 139-140, 205), and thereafter 
Greener's ability to support the plaintiff would depend on 
what his children, who were opposed to. his marriage to the 
plaintiff (Tr. 22, 140, 205), would give him (Tr. 140) .. 
Upon the plaintiff's return from California, as a result 
of the receipt by mail of a bank statement, some question 
arose as to the bank accounts, and when the plaintiff asked. 
Greener what he had done with them he told her it was 
none of her business (Tr. 35, 176) , that she was crazy that 
she didn't write out some checks and get some of the mon-
ey (Tr. 35), and that if she wanted to know what he had 
done with the money to go and talk to his sons, George and 
Ken. He also told the plaintiff after further talking that 
she could stay at his home with him and he would feed her, 
and that's all she would get, or she could get out of it, it 
didn;t make a bit of difference to him. She chose to leave, 
and left with no means of support, and with only five dol-
-lars that she had returned with from California (Tr. 36, 
177). 
Some time after plaintiff's return from California, her 
grandson, Walter Mories, rode from Springville to Provo 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
on the same bus with Greener and conversed with him. 
During the conversation, Greener was telling Mories about 
himself and his grandmother, said he felt pretty bad about 
it, and that "there would be three .less people in the world 
if he hadn't read the Bible on the consequences of murder 
and suicide"* (Tr. 59-60). 
This conversation was later related to the plaintiff by 
the grandson after plaintiff filed this suit. She thereupon 
consulted her counsel and asked him if she should have 
Greener put under bonds for threatening her (Tr. 84). The 
effect of the knowledge of the conversation frightened the 
plaintiff, because Greener had told her many times before 
that he would do something desperate. It made her ner-
vous and so sick that she had to go to the doctor (Tr. 85). 
The effect of all of the above acts of the defendant 
Thomas Richardson Greener has been to make the plaintiff 
extremely nervous and unhappy, to have trouble sleeping 
(Tr. 38-39), to get up in the night and walk around, and to 
cry and to have severe headaches and a poor appetite (Tr. 
68-70). 
The amount of money withdrawn from the Salt Lake 
City depositories by James Aften Greener was $18,271.04 
(R, 114). The amount on deposit in the Springville bank in 
the joint account before the ·funds were transferred to Af-
ten was $1,608.23 (Exhibit 0) or a total sum of $19,879.27. 
*We believe the fair inference from this statetpen.t to 
be the killing of Mrs. Greener and her sister Sarah (whom 
the testimony reflects Greener dislikes very much) and his 
own suicide. 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
I 
The court erred in holding that plaintiff is not entitled 
to a decree of divorce from defendant Thomas Richardson 
Greener. 
II 
The court erred in failing to hold that plaintiff is en-
titled to a decree of divorce from defendant Thomas Rich-
ardson Greener. 
III 
The court erred in holding that the defendant is wil-
ling to resume marital relations. 
IV 
The court erred in entering its decree in favor of the 
defeiJ.dants and against the plaintiff in that the pleadings 
do not support the judgment. 
v 
The court erred in that its Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Decree are not supported by the evidence. 
VI 
The court erred in holding thaCthe defendant was and 
. is the sole owner of the funds referred to as on deposit in 
various depositories on and prior to December 22, 1947, 
and his. withdrawi_ng them was not fraudulent and consti-
tuted no cruelty against the plaintiff. 
VII 
The court erred in failing to hold that the transfers 
· of funds in the joint accounts of the plaintiff and defendant 
Thomas Richardson Greener to James Aften Greener on 
or about December 22, 1947, were fraudulent as to the 
plaintiff, and void. 
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The court erred in holding that defendant James Af-
ten Greener holds said funds in trust for the use and bene-
fit of Thomas Richardson Greener during his natural life· 
time, and that the defendants are entitled to have said funds 
released from the custody of the court. 
IX 
The court erred in holding that no pre-marital agree-
ment was entered into between plaintiff and defendant 
Thomas Richardson Greener, in form as required by law 
(33-5-4 Subsection 3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943). 
X 
The court erred in failing to hold that plaintiff and 
Greener entered into an oral agreement in consideration 
of the setting aside of the decree of divorce, which agree-
ment was further consummated by the signing of certain 
written agreements, whereby the plaintiff became the own-
er as joint tenant with Greener on and after about April 
16, 1947, of funds, theretofore on deposit with certain de-
positories, to the sole and separate account of Greener. 
XI 
The court erred in holding that defendant Thomas 
Richardson Greener is the sole owner of the funds now in 
the custody of the court. 
XII 
The court erred in failing to decree and set apart as 
the sole and separate property of the plaintiff, one-half of 
the total fund of $19,879.31 which was on deposit in the 
joint accounts of the plaintiff and Greener on and prior to 
December 22, 1947. 
XIII 
The court erred in holding that the sole purpose and 
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intention of the plaintiff and Greener in placing the plain-
tiff's name. on the various agreements and bank books of 
the depositories was to avoid probate, and neither of them 
at any time, considered that the plaintiff owned any pres-
ent interest in said funds. 
XIV 
The court erred in failing to impress a trust on that 
portion of the funds remaining after deduction of plaintiff's 
one~half interest,, for her support and maintenance, as well 
as fqr her right of survivorship. 
XV 
The court erred in holding that plaintiff is not entitled 
to attorneys' fees· or costs, and that the plaintiff should 
bear her own expenses. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
.. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAIN-
TIFF IS NOT E.NTITLED TO A DECREE OF DIVORCE 
FROM DEFENDANT THOMAS RICHARDSON GREEN-
ER. 
Seeking a divorce on the ground of cruelty (together 
with other relief hereinafter discussed) plaintiff has alleged 
in her second amended complaint in support of this cause 
. of action specific acts upon the part of Greener as follows: 
, 1.. The fraudulent conveyance of all his property (as 
well as that of plaintiff), except whatever interest he may 
have in his _home, and.the stripping of himself of all means 
of supporting the plaintiff. 
2. Accusing the plaintiff on many occasions of rob-
bing him .of $2,000. 
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3. Constant quarreling with the plaintiff ·over the re-
turn of the $2,000. 
4. Threats by Greener that he "might do something 
desperate." 
5. The knife episode. 
6. Telling the plaintiff that she could stay with him 
and he would feed her and that was all she would get or 
she could get out, it made no difference to him. 
The Court found that "the defendant at no time dur-
ing said marriage, held the plaintiff up to ridicule or shame, 
nor did he at any time do any act or fail to do any act 
which he should have done, which could have caused the 
plaintiff mental anguish or bodily suffering, and at no time 
during said marriage between plaintiff and defendant did 
the defendant wield a knife or make any threats toward 
the plaintiff, nor did the defendant commit any other acts 
or violence during said marriage." 
The Court also found that the withdrawing by Greener 
of the funds on deposit in the various depositories was not 
fraudulent and constituted no cruelty against the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff takes issue with these findings on the 
ground that there is no substantial evidence in the record 
to sustain them, but, on the contrary, the plaintiff has 
proved, by substantial testimony that cannot be impeached 
by the record, that she is entitled to a divorce on any or all 
of the grounds set forth above. 
Before discussing these grounds, however, we desire 
to point out that the only witnesses appearing on behalf of 
the defendants were one Owen Harris Beardall (Tr. 94-98), 
and Thomas Richardson Greener, the principal defendant; 
James After Greener, the other defendant, did not appear 
as a witness and testify at the trial on the merits. 
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At the outset, and also before discussing the grounds 
for divorce, we point out to the Court that there are many 
grave and serious contradictions in Greener's testimony; 
that if they do not in effect amount to perjury, at least they 
show an utter disregard on Greener's part for his oath, 
whether it be on the witness stand or in the privacy of his 
own lawyer's office when solemnly swearing to his answer 
and counterclaim in this suit. 
In subsection (B) of this section of the brief we point 
out the contradictions in Greener's testimony as to his ac-
cusations of plaintiff's robbing him. 
On the hearing on the first order to show cause, which 
. hearing was, of course, concerned in finding out the nature 
. and extent of Greener's property and his ability to provide 
. the plaintiff with temporary alimony and suit money, he 
testified on direct examination that he had no stocks or 
bonds from which he got any·money; that after the trans-
fer of the funds on deposit to his son Aften, he had no mon-
ey of his own but "a few coppers in my purse" (Tr. 196); 
and that he expected to live during the next few months 
and the remainder of his life on his friends and relatives 
(Tr. 197). On cross examination Greener testified as fol-
lows (Tr. 202): 
.4'Q. Now, you did have some stocks and bonds, didn't 
you? 
A. Government bonds, yes. 
Q. You still have them, don't you? 
A. I cashed them. 
Q. When did you cash them? 
A. Well, I cashed two of them the day we got out of 
the Farmers and Merchants Bank. 
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Q. But since that time you have had government 
bonds, since you went back together again? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you still have them, haven't you? 
A. I cashed them, turned them in. 
Q. What did you do with the cash? 
A. Gave it to where it belongs. 
Q. How is that? 
A. I gave it to where the rest of it went, gave it to 
my son." 
And again (Tr. 205): 
"Q. And you want the court now to believe you gave 
away everything you had at that time and now that you 
have nothing whatever to support yourself? 
A. Yes sir." 
It is hard to conceive of any clearer or stronger state-
ment Greener could have made to the effect that he had 
then stripped himself clean, except for the few coppers in 
his purse, and that he then had no bonds or other property 
of any kind whatever (except his interest in his home) with 
which to support himself. 
But, it develops four months later, that Greener did 
have some government bonds at the time of the previous 
hearing because he testified at the trial of this cause as 
follows· (Tr. 124-125): 
"Q. You have absolutely no property or any~ money 
at the present time? 
A. None whatever. 
Q. For how long has it been since you have been in 
that position? 
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A. Since I cashed my last government bonds to pay 
the money that went to her. 
Q. All right, when was that? 
A. Well, it is within the last month now. 
Q. All right. Now, were those government bonds 
cashed subsequent to the time you were here and testified 
to the Court? 
A. .Most of them. 
Q. How many government bonds did you have at the 
time you· testified here at the previous hearing? 
A. About four. 
Q. And what was the face amount of those bonds? 
A. They was two of them was 50's, one was a $100, 
and the other was $25, as I remember. 
Q. But you did have those bonds and that property 
at the time you testified here in this Court on the previous 
occasion, is that right? 
A. Yes." 
And (Tr. 126-127): 
"Q. Now, what did you mean when you answered 'Well 
I have got a few coppers in my purse'? Did you mean that 
was all the money you had or property? 
A. That was all I had, was just a little bit what I had 
in my purse except those four bonds that was left over that 
I hadn't cashed. 
Q. But at that time you didn't tell the Court you had 
those four bonds; you told the Court in effect you didn't 
have any other property or money except a few coppers 
in your purse, isn't that right? 
A. Yes, sir, that's right. 
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Q. But you did have these bonds? 
A. Those bonds. 
Q. And those bonds are the source of the money by 
which you have paid Mrs. Greener; is that right? 
A. Yes, they are are all gone now. 
Q. Now at the time you gave this money away to 
Afton, that was on the 22nd of December, wasn't it, of last 
year? 
A. I can't remember just what date. 
Q. \Vhat property did you have at that time? 
A. \Vhy, I had the deed to my home and a few cents 
in my purse and those four bonds that I had not cashed. 
Q. And that is all you had? 
A. That's all I had." 
These statements are not merely inconsistencies in his 
testimony or mere inadvertent misstatements, but direct, 
un.equivocal and positive statements of a material fact that, 
we submit, actually amount to perjury. 
In Greener's cross complaint or counterclaim, which 
is sworn to by him under oath, he alleges: "(c) That on nu-
merous occasions during said marriage the plaintiff left 
the home of plaintiff and defendant and stayed away for 
long periods of time, and has refused to take care of said 
home" (R, 107-108). 
But on direct examination the following took place (Tr. 
116-117): 
"Q. During your marriage has the plaintiff ever left 
your home and gone to her sister? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Tell the Court about that. 
A. After she had came back to live with me, the sec-
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ond time that she lived with me, her sister would come 
there and stay there until evening, after dark. Then when 
she would leave she would say, 'I am going part way with 
her, part way home.' She was living in the house up on 
the hill. And she said, 'I will be back in a little while.' She 
done that repeatedly, several times. Shall I go on? 
Q. Did she ever go away and stay away over days 
at a time? 
A. Oh, no." 
In the cross complaint, Greener, after alleging the 
above and other facts, alleged that such acts "have ren-
dered the marriage relation intolerable and no longer en-
durable, and that unless a divorce is granted cross com-
plainant's health will be greatly impaired by reason of plain-
tiff's actions as above set out (R, 108). 
Counsel proceeded to ask Greener about the acts of the 
plaintiff, got his answers and then to finish his proof in 
support of Greener's prayer for divorce, asked Greener to 
tell in his own words how the remarks, words and actions 
of the plaintiff affected him (Tr. 118-119). His answer 
was (Tr. 119): 
"A. I couldn't sleep. I will state a little further, when 
I slept with her, in the same bed, I had laid all night won-
dering how in the devil I was going to get out of the net 
she had me in. And I couldn't eat, I couldn't sleep, and it 
pretty near killed me. The neighbors could see it on me. 
Q. Made you nervous? 
A. Made me nervous. Made me so I wasn't myself." 
Everything was all covered; counsel had submitted the 
proof except for the property question (Tr. 119). Then on 
cross examination Greener dropped a bomb shell. He sta-
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ted that he didn't want a divorce, never wanted one, had 
never asked for one, was not asking for one now, and he 
even went so far as to deny that he ever "signed any paper 
at all" in which he "asked for a decree of divorce" (Tr. 146-
149). Counsel was embarrassed-he requested leave of the 
Court to ask some leading questions, and was granted leave, 
over plaintiff's objections, to do so. He then very care-
fully l2d Greener back over the circumstances of his read-
ing, signing, and swearing to the cross complaint and to all 
of counsel's questions except one Greener readily answered 
"Yes." His only one other answer was, "I think so" (Tr. 
150-154). The situation had been cleared, the cross com-
plaint had been signed under proper circumstances-Green-
er had read it, and knew and understood what it contained. 
But-Greener refused to stay put. On recross examina-
tion, to the same questions practically, in substance, Green-
er now answered '~No." However, he did admit very defin-
itely that he read and signed the pleading (Tr. 154) and 
then again proceeded to say that the pleading was true-
but again upon being asked about the specific allegation 
concerning the plaintiff's leaving his home and staying 
away for long periods of time, he stated that he didn't re-
call reading such in the pleading, but if it were in it, the 
fact was not true (Tr. 155). 
Either counsel, in attaching his signature and seal of 
his office to the answer and cross complaint, is subject to 
censure, or Greener had so little regard for his oath that 
we believe he has also in this instance committed perjury. 
We give counsel the benefit of the doubt. 
Even if this instance did not actually amount to per· 
jury, is the testimony of one who vascillates from one ex-
treme to the other, depending on who' is examining him, 
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entitled to credence? Is this the kind of testimony upon 
which a litigant can prevail in a suit in a court of equity? 
If so, it certainly places a premium on false testimony, to 
say the least. 
The very gist of the court's opinion is that the con-
veyance of the funds by Greener to Aften was not fraudu-
lent; yet how does the court justify the imposition of a 
trust on the funds if he did not disbelieve the testimony of 
Greener as to the bona fides of the conveyance? He could 
have arrived at this result in no other way. At least in this 
instance the Court did not and could not have believed the 
testimony of Greener. 
We proceed now to a discussion of the points which we 
claim entitled plaintiff to a divorce. 
A. The fraudulent conveyance. 
The record herein shows that as of December 22, 1947, 
there was on deposit in the joint accounts of "Thomas R. 
or Amy E. Greener" in various depositories a total sum of 
$19,879.27. In addition to this, Greener owned certain gov-
ernment bonds and a home* in Springville (R, 148). Green-
er's testimony concerning the time of the disposition of the 
bonds is conflicting (Tr. 194, 196, 202, 125, 127). How-
ever, he makes it clear on the hearing on the merits that 
at that time he had no property other than the home•, 
and had no source of income (Tr. 112, 124, 128), and that 
his ability to support the plaintiff depended on what his 
*This home stands in the name of Thomas E. Greener 
and Lucinda J. Greener, his former wife, who is now de-
ceased, as tenants in common (Def. Exhibit 1). 
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children, who were opposed to his marriage to plaintiff, 
would give him (Tr. 139, 140). 
Even assuming arguendo that plaintiff was not a joint 
tf'nant with Greener of the funds in the depositories, but 
that the funds were in his own name and his separate prop-
erty and that plaintiff's only rights therein were what the 
law entitled her to as his wife, the transfer of the funds by 
Greener to his son Aften, whereby the former stripped him-
self of all means by which to support and maintain the 
plaintiff, constituted a fraud against the plaintiff. In such 
circumstances the wife is considered to occupy a position 
analogous to that of a creditor whose debtor has conveyed 
property in fraud of the creditor. 
In Trader v. Trader, (Idaho 1930) 285 P. 678, a suit 
for divorce and to set aside a conveyance made by the hus-
band, the court said (p. 679): 
"Her husband had a right to convey his separate 
property without her knowledge or consent, unless 
said conveyance was with the design to defraud plain-
tiff of a right growing out of the marital relation-
ship." 
In Murray v. 1\Iurray, (Cal. 1896) 47 P. 37, where a 
wife sued for maintenance and to set aside certain transfers 
of property by the husband as fraudulent, the court said 
(p. 39): 
"Every ·transfer of property made with intent. to 
delay or defraud any creditor or other person of his de-
mands is by the statute of Elizabeth, reenacted in Civ. 
Code, Sec. 3439*, declared void as against all creditors 
*This section is similar to Sec. 33-1-8, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943. 
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of the debtor, etc. ·The wife, though not in strictness 
a creditor of the husband, is yet, as concerns her right 
to maintenance, so far within the protection of this stat-
ute that it avoids his transfers made with the design 
to defeat such right. Green v. Adams, 59 Vt. 609, 10 
Atl. 742; Tyler v. Tyler, 126 Ill. 525, 537, 21 N. E. 616 
and cases cited; Stuart v. Stuart, 123 Mass. 370; .... 
As shown, the plaintiff here has a demand enforceable 
in equity, and it may be charged specifically upon the 
property described in the complaint. Robinson v. Rob-
inson, 79 Cal. 511, 21 P. 1095; . . . Plumb v. Bate-
man, 2 App. Cas. D. C. 170, 171; Ha.nscomb v. Hans-
comb (Colo. App.) 39 P. 885." 
To like effect is Petty v. Petty (Idaho 1946) 168 P. 2d 
818, involving a conveyance by father held to be in fraud 
of minor's right to support. 
This doctrine is also applicable to cases where trans-
fers of property have been made by the husband in order 
to defeat the wife's right of inheritance. In LeStrange v. 
LeStrange (1934) 242 App. Div. 74, 273 N. Y. S. 21, the 
court cancelled, on the ground of fraud, a trust agreement, 
conveyances and transfers by which a prospective husband, 
the day after the issuance of the marriage license, had 
transferred his property to himself as trustee, whereby he 
was to pay the income to him~elf and after his death the 
fund to be distributed to his three sons by a former mar-
riage. It was held that a man cannot deliberately, by his 
own purpose or through the inducement of other persons, 
strip himself of all inheritable property in fraud of his pros-
pective wife, to whom he has represented that he has suf-
ficient property for their comfortable support and main-
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tenance, in which she will be entitled to share upon. his de-
cease. 
In Payne v. Tatem (1930) 236 Ky. 306, 33 S. W. (2d) 
2, (in which a judgment setting aside a $4,000 gift by the 
deceased husband of plaintiff to a daughter by a former 
marriage was affirmed), the court stated that in view of 
the fact that the decedent had only $4,660 at the time of 
the gift, there was no escape from the conclusion that the 
burden was on the daughter to overcome the presumption 
of fraud, although the donor had been unusually devoted 
to her; had taken a large number of meals at her home, 
and he and his wife had visited her frequently. 
A conveyance in fraud of the marital rights of the wife 
of an heir was held to be shown in Blodgett v. Blodgett 
(1932) 266 TIL App. 517, where such heir had received in 
a partition proceeding a smaller share of the estate than 
he would otherwise have been entitled to receive, by means 
of a scheme, previously entered into with another heir, that 
judgment should be confessed against the former on a fic-
titious note purporting to have been made by him to the 
decedent. 
An owner of property, in order to defeat the inchoate 
rights of his wife under the Decedent Estate Law, which 
in place of dower gives a widow certain rights in the prop-
erty of which her husband dies seized, may not make such 
a transfer as will enable him to keep control of his prop-
erty and yet purposely prevent the property rights of his 
wife from maturing at his death. Bodner v. Feit (1936) 
247 App. Div. 119, 286 N. Y. S. 814. 
Numerous other authorities to this same effect might 
be cited, but would unduly prolong this brief. 
In the light of these authorities, there can be no ques-
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tion that the transfer of the funds on December 22, 1947, 
by Greener to Aften was a fraud upon this plaintiff. 
Did the act amount to cruelty? We think it did. 
Here we have the picture of a scheming husband, who, 
by his own testimony, lay in bed with his wife at night, 
unable to sleep, "wondering how in the devil I was going 
to get out of that net she had me in", and studying how to 
get her name off of their joint bank accounts (Tr. 119, 
138), and then, while she was on a visit to California, with-
drawing all of their means of support and maintenance, 
by removal of the funds on deposit and giving them to his 
son Aften by a previous marriage, as a Christmas present, 
leaving plaintiff thereafter subject to the charity and mercy 
of Greener's family and friends, who were antagonistic to 
her, for whatever charity they might deign to dole out to 
her for support. This-in the face of the fact that there 
had never been any threats by the plaintiff to remove any 
of the funds or to do anything "except live up to the agree-
ment with respect to the funds" (Tr. 134). 
While we shall show later in this brief that Greener's 
promises and agreements went further, he at least went 
so far as to admit that he promised the plaintiff originally 
that if she would marry him, and later, after the divorce, 
if she would return to him, she would never have to want 
(Tr. 106), and he guaranteed that she would never have 
to go on old age pension (Tr. 102, 103). Yet, in spite of 
these promises, he deliberately put himself in a situation 
in which he would be unable to fulfill them. 
At the time of the fraudulent transfer of the funds to 
Aften, Greener was but a few days under 80 ·years. of age. 
The plaintiff was 65. Her life expectancy was between 11 
and 12 years, while Greener's was between 4% and 5% 
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years. The probabilities are that plaintiff will outlive 
Greener by several years. Is she to be pushed off on ·his 
relatives for charitable. support and maintenance? If the 
decision~ of the lower court is sustained, and the wishes of 
Greener, as shown by his fraudulent design, are carried 
out, that will be her lot. 
We sub1nit that this act on the part of Greener, while 
constituting a fraud upon the plaintiff, was also an extreme 
act of cruelty, and- of itself justifies the granting of a di-
vorce to plaintiff. 
In its opinion the lower court found it necessary to 
determine plaintiff's rights in the funds in order to ascer-
tain whether Greener's transfer of them ·constituted· cruel-
ty to plaintiff (R, 117). The court held Greener to be the 
sole owner of the funds, and thus his withdrawing them, 
whether surreptitiously or not, was not ·against any present 
right of the plaintiff, and thus was not cruelty· (R. 121). 
The court thus recognized, and the bur.den of the opinion is, 
that if the transfer was fraudulent as to the plaintiff,. and 
if she had any rights to the accounts and money~ therein, 
then. the acts of Greener would amount to cruelty. The 
court's opinion,. however, was -directed solely to the ques-
tion whether the plaintiff was a present joint tenant of the 
funds (which he held her not to be) , but he completely 
overlooked the fact that we have above demonstrated, that 
the transfer of the funds was fraudulent, even though she 
was held to have no present ownership of the funds. We 
think it to be inescapable that if the lower court had found 
the transfer to have been fraudulent, it would have found 
that the conduct of Greener in regard to the funds consti-
tuted cruelty. 
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The record is clear that the acts of Greener with re-
spect to these funds contributed to her physical and men-
tal condition, as testified to by plaintiff, and is one of the 
facts that makes it impossible for her to return to Greener 
and make a go of married life (Tr. 38-39). 
If, in addition to what we have assumed as a fact in 
the foregoing argument, plaintiff owned a present undivided 
one-half interest in the funds on deposit (which we hope 
to demonstrate as a fact later in this brief)) then her po-
sition is much stronger. 
B. Accusing plaintiff of robbing him. 
Plaintiff testified that on more than one occasion 
Greener accused her of robbing him of two thousand dol-
lars (Tr. 34). This is an accusation of crime which if false 
constitutes cruelty, and of itself or in connection With other 
causes may amount to cruelty. 19 C. J., p. 53. 
Concerning this accusation, the lower court, in its opin-
ion, states that "It could easily be found that the defendant 
accused plaintiff of robbing him in connection with the 
$2,000 settlement. There is nothing in the record, how-
ever, to show that he did so to anyone else but her,-that 
he never held her up to ridicule or shame by it, or that it 
caused her great mental anguish of bodily suffering." 
We can well agree with the lower court that it could 
easily be found that Greener accused the plaintiff of rob-
bing him. What we cannot understand is how the court 
could fail to make such a finding in the case, in view of the 
record. 
In the first place, the plaintiff testified to the fact cate-
gorically, and we believe that plaintiff's testimony is wor-
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thy of belief in every detail. While Greener has denied 
certain of her testimony, including the fact that he ever 
accused her of robbing him (Tr. 115), the record will not 
bear with him in his denials. In fact, as we have herein-
before shown, the record is replete with instances where 
Greener has given conflicting testimony and made state-
ments under oath that, if they do not amount to perjury, 
show at least a careless disregard for his oath. 
We invite the Court's attention to the very positive 
denial of Greener as to the accusation of robbery upon his 
direct examination (Tr. 115). In contrast to this, we set 
forth certain testimony of Greener upon the first hearing 
on order to show cause, as follows (Tr. 199): 
"Q. Why did you withdraw that money from the 
bank, Mr. Greener? 
A. Because she robbed me of two thousand, and I 
knew that she was after the other, and which she married 
me. I could see all the way through that she married me 
for money, not for T. R. Greener. 
Q. Now, how did she rob you of two thousand dol-
lars? 
A. She had me on a pin hook, and I couldn't get 
away." 
This statement was volunteered so readily by Greener 
in open court, in the presence of persons who were in the 
court room on a regular law and motion day, that it is hard 
to understand how the lower court could ever have con-
cluded that there is nothing in the record to show that 
Greener made the accusation to anyone else but plaintiff. 
Pursuing this matter a little further, after Greener 
on direct examination very emphatically and positively de-
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nied having ever made the accusation, plaintiff's counsel 
confronted Greener. with his previous testimony, and when 
asked whether he made such a statement on the previous 
hearing, he answered, "I don't remember saying that." (Tr. 
128-129).- However, at a later point in his testimony, when 
he was again asked about having made the statement, his 
answer was, "I guess I said it." (Tr. 145). We would urge 
to the Court that this speaks volumes in support of plain-
tiff's testimony, and against defendant's. 
And again, this is but another of the elements which 
contributed toward making plaintiff awfully nervous (Tr. 
38) ,· unable to sleep, and unhappy, etc. (Tr. 39, 68-69). 
C. . Constant quarreling over return of $2,000. 
Except to point out that the plaintiff . testified that 
there were frequent quarrelings. over the two thousand dol-
lars _(Tr. 37), we are content to rely upon what has been 
set forth .in the next preceding subdivision as being proof 
of the many quarrels, and the effect of such quarrels upon 
the plaintiff. See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
Wolfe in Johnson v. Johnson, 107 U 147, 152 P. 2d 426,'429. 
D. Threats by Greener; E, Knife .episode. 
Growing out of the quarrels over · the two thousand 
dollars, the· plaintiff testified Greener threatened her many 
times, saying: that he might do something desperate. On 
one such occasion Greener demonstrated what he had in 
mind- -by these threats. He took a paring knife that was 
on the cupboard, drew the back of the blade across plain-
tiff's -throat, and then with a stabbing motion hit her with 
the handle part over her heart (Tr. 33-34, 80). 
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Concerning the knife incident, the lower court said 
that "If it were satisfactorily proven that the knife inci-
dent were true, it would undoubtedly be such an act of cru-
elty as to justify a divorce." Because there was no direct 
corroboration of plaintiff's testimony in this regard, the ve-
hemence of Greener's denial of the act, the fact that the 
incident, if true, would be the only circumstance of violence 
in the record, and the fact that plaintiff never told of the 
incident to relatives and friends who accused Greener of it 
and had either an express or implied admission, ·the court 
could not believe that plaintiff established it by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 
We agree with the lower court that the knife incident, 
if true. would amount to cruelty justifying a divorce, but 
we strenuously disagree with the court's reasoning in con-
cluding that the incident had not been proved. Was this a 
mere figment of the plaintiff's imagination? Certainly the 
record discloses no instance where plaintiff's testimony 
has been impeached, no instance where she lied or perjured 
her testimony. Is it reasonable to believe that she lied in 
this instance? Greener denied -the act, but is mere vehe-
mence enough? Surely, if a person who has been so dra-
matically threatened must relate the episode to relatives 
or friends, who must accuse the party of it, and secure 
either an express or implied admission, before the threat 
can be established as made, pity the person who appeals 
to the law for protection against such a threat. He will be 
so busy running around to first this person and that per-
son, telling them of the incident and having them go to the 
one making the threat to get either an express or implied 
admission, that he would in many instances become a vic-
tim of the threat long before he could possibly obtain the 
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protection of the law. If this be the test to be applied in 
proving that a threat was made, then we venture to say 
that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred a threat cannot 
be proved, because we doubt that in one out of a hundred 
cases of threat, has the person threatened been able to 
prove by a third person an express or implied admission 
of such a threat from the person making the same. Sup-
pose the threat had been made and the plaintiff had run 
around to her relatives and friends, told them of the threat, 
and the relatives and friends had gone to Greener and ac-
cused him of it, but to each· one he had vehemently denied 
making it. How, then, could it be proved? The court by 
this rule has made the act impossible of proof. Reductio 
ad absurdum. 
There is absolutely nothing in the record justifying 
the statement of the court that plaintiff "never repeated 
it [the threat] to any of her relatives or friends, etc." 
There is in the record another incident of at least an 
implied threat by Greener, in the statement made to plain-
tiff's grandson that "there would be three less people in 
the world if he [Greener] hadn't read the Bible on the con-
sequences of murder and suicide" (Tr. 59-60). This inci-
dent was never denied by Greener, vehemently or otherwise. 
Plaintiff understood the meaning of these threats. In 
the one case she said, "Old man, you want to be damn gobd 
and sure you make a good job of it" (Tr. 80), and this was 
another of the elements which contributed to the physical 
and mental condition of plaintiff, as above shown. In the 
other case, she was put in such fear because ·of it and the 
many threats Greener had previously made, that she was 
made nervous and so sick that she had to go to the doctor 
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er under bonds (Tr. 85). 
F. Telling plaintiff that she could stay or get out, etc. 
The plaintiff testified that Greener told her during a 
quarrel soon after she returned from California that she 
could stay at his home with him and he would feed her, 
and that's all she would get, or she could get out of it, 
it didn't make a bit of difference to him. She chose to 
leave. 
The court found against the plaintiff in this regard 
(R, 150). 
We submit this matter on the lack of verity on the part 
of Greener's testimony as elsewhere considered in this brief. 
II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A DECREE OF DIVORCE 
FROM DEFENDANT THOMAS RICHARDSON GREEN-
ER. 
We rest our case under this heading on the argument 
under section I of this brief. 
III 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DE-
FENDANT IS WILLING TO RESUME MARITAL RE-
LATIONS. 
On cross examination Greener testified as follows (Tr. 
147): 
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"Q. "Do you think you and Mrs. Greener could go 
back and live together happily? 
A. We would have to do different than we done be-
fore if we did." 
and again (Tr. 149-150): 
"I say, if she were to come back to you would you be 
able to get the money back from Afton and put it in the 
bank? 
A. I never said I wanted her back. 
Q. Do you want her back. 
A. I didn't say so. 
Q. Well, do you? 
A. She wouldn't come and I wouldn't have her if--
Q. Do you want her back? 
A. She wouldn't come. 
Q. That is your answer to my question, is it? 
A. She would have to promise me certain things, she 
would have to make affidavit to certain things before I 
would take her back." 
The above, we submit, is anything but impressive tes-
timony showing a willingness to resume marital relations. 
It certainly holds forth little hope that a resumption would 
be successful. 
Mrs. Greener testified that she did not think there was 
any possibility of her returning to Mr. Greener and making 
a go of married life after what had happened (Tr. 39). 
To assume that plaintiff and Greener can resume mari-
tal relations successfully, is to close one's eyes to realities. 
Here, in the course of a brief span of married life of less 
than two years, the present case is the second time the par-
ties have found themselves in the divorce court. The 
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wounds caused the plaintiff by the acts of Greener are too 
deep to ever be erased. The marriage in the first place 
was not shown to be one of love, but at the sole instance 
of Greener and for his convenience. It was based largely, 
if not entirely, on trust and reliance upon the word of the 
parties. Greener has betrayed that trust, and thus re-
moved any basis for a successful reconciliation. The best 
interests of society cannot be subserved by attempting to 
force these two people to live together again. Lundgreen 
v. Lundgreen, Utah , 184 P. 2d 670. 
This Court has on several occasions recognized and 
repeated the fact that courts usually grant the wife a di-
vorce on the grounds of cruelty on much less evidence than 
they do the husband. Doe v. Doe, 48 U. 200, 212, 158 P. 
781; Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 U. 580, 245 P. 335; Cordner v. 
Cordner, 91 U. 466, 61 P. 2d 601; Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, 
supra; Johnson v. Johnson, 107 U. 147, 152 P. 2d 426; 
Woolley v. Woolley, 195 P. 2d 7 43. While we invoke this 
doctrine in the present case, we, in no sense of the word, 
are to be construed as admitting that plaintiff's case is to 
any degree a weak one. On the contrary, we earnestly 
submit that the plaintiff's case is a strong one, and that 
the record abundantly supports her cause of action and 
right to a divorce. 
We urge upon the Court that this is a case in which 
this Court would be clearly justified and should substitute 
its findings in favor of the plaintiff in the place of those 
made by the court below in favor of Greener. Steed v. 
Steed, 54 U. 244, 181 P. 445; Petty v. Clark, _____l], __ 
192 P. 2d 589; Foreman v. Foreman, __ u __ 176 P. 
2d 144. 
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IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS DECREE 
IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST THE 
PLAINTIFF IN THAT THE PLEADINGS DO NOT SUP-
PORT THE J"UDGMENT. 
v 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT 
THE TRANSFERS OF THE FUNDS IN THE JOINT AC-
COUNTS OF THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT 
THOMAS RICHARDSON GREENER TO JAMES AFTEN 
GRJEENER ON OR ABOUT DECEMBER 22, 1947, WERE 
FRAUDULENT AS TO THE PLAINTIFF, AND VOID. 
VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DE-
FENDANT JAMES AFTEN GREENER HOLDS SAID 
FUNDS IN TRUST FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF 
THOMAS RICHARDSON GREENER DURING HIS NAT-
URAL LIFETIME, AND THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE 
ENTITLED TO HAVE SAID FUNDS RELEASED FROM 
THE CUSTODY OF THE COURT. 
As the assignments immediately above are so inter-
related, we shall argue them together. 
We have shown in Subsection A of Section I of this 
brief as one of the grounds for divorce, that the transfers 
of the funds in the joint accounts by Greener to Aften on 
or about December 22, 1947, were fraudulent as to the 
plaintiff, regardless of whether the plaintiff had a direct 
interest in the funds or only such rights as the law accorded 
her by reason of her marital status. If this be true, then 
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the court below erred in not finding that the transfers were 
fraudulent. Likewise, the court erred in finding that Aften 
holds the funds in trust for the use and benefit of Greener, 
and that the defen<:lants are entitled to the release of the 
funds. 
We invite the Court's attention to the fact that if the 
answer and cross complaint filed in this cause (R, 105-108) 
may be construed as an answer by Aften, as well as by 
Greener, nevertheless, Aften has prayed for no relief and 
Greener seeks relief only as cross complainant. After de-
fendants rested, plaintiff moved the court to dismiss Green-
er's cross complaint, but the court indicated that he could 
not see where anything would be accomplished by it, and 
that it might remain just as it is (Tr. 160-161). The court's 
finding of fact number 14 ( R, 150) is tantamount to the 
dismissal of the cross complaint; consequently there is no 
prayer on the part of either defendant for any affirmative 
or general relief. 
The testimony of Greener, both on the hearings on the 
orders to show cause and on the trial, as well as that of 
Aften on the order to show cause, was that the funds had 
been given to Aften by Greener. Neither of them asked 
for any affirmative relief whatsoever as to the funds, or 
that a trust be imposed for the benefit of either. As a 
mere matter of pleading, therefore, how can the court's de-
cision be sustained? There is no pleading on the part of 
either party that will sustain the imposition of a trust in 
favor of Greener and, as no such relief was prayed by 
either defendant, the pleadings will not support the judg-
ment in this respect. Cain v. Stewart et ux., 47 U. 160; 
\Vheelwright v. Roman, 50 U. 10. 
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Quite aside from the pleading angle, the court had no 
authority to impress a trust upon the funds in favor of 
Greener when the transfers were, as we have shown previ-
ously herein, fraudulent as to the plaintiff. 
In Saint v. Saint (Cal. 1932) 7 P. 374, which was a case 
where husband, who was indebted to ·creditors to the ex-
tent of $30,000, transferred to his mother and brother his 
interest in his father's estate for the purpose of putting the 
inheritance beyond reach of creditors, the court, in set-
ting aside the conveyance as fraudulent, said (pp. 376-377): 
"No rule of law is more strictly adhered to than 
the rule that equity will-not lend its aid to establish 
a trust or enforce a contract which is tainted with 
fraud. . He who executes a conveyance of property for 
the purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding his 
creditors cannot by an action in equity obtain a re-
conveyance from his grantee, nor can anyone claiming 
under him, except an innocent purchaser. The authori-
ties supporting this well-known rule are legion, and we 
need cite only the following: Allstead v. Laumeister, 
16 Cal. App. 59, 116 P. 296; Anderson v. Nelson, 83 
Cal. App. 1-6, 256 P. 294, 296." (Emphasis supplied) 
See also Lyon v. Mazeris, 132 P. 2d 982. 
In Jolly v. Graham, 222 Ill. 550, 78 N. E. 919, in which 
the court set aside certain conveyances made by a hus-
band, for the fraudulent purpose of putting the property 
out of his hands to defeat the marital rights of his wife in 
case she should sue him for separate maintenance or for 
a divorce, the court said: 
" . the evidence shows that those convey-
ances were made and procured to be made by Chas. H. 
Graham, the father of the complainants below, for the 
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fraudulent purpose of putting the property out of his 
hands to defeat the marital rights of his wife in case 
she should sue him for separate maintenance or for a 
divorce and alimony, which being true, a court of equi-
ty will not set aside those deeds on his application or 
that of the complainants, his heirs. We think the evi-
dence clearly shows that the conveyances in question 
were executed without consideration. 
It does clearly appear that the intention, both, 
of the grantor, Charles H. Graham, in making the deed 
. to his mother and afterwards consenting that the prop-
erty should be conveyed to his sister was for the pur-
pose of cheating and defrauding his wife. This being 
true, the conveyances became binding upon the gran-
tor, Charles H. Graham, and all parties in privity with 
him. Having conveyed the property for the fraudu-
lent purpose of defeating the rights of his wife, the law 
will leave him where he placed himself. Both his 
mouth and that of his heirs are closed to question the 
validity of the conveyances. The law will not permit a 
party to deliberately put his property out of his con-
trol for a fraudulent purpose, and then, through the 
intervention of a court of equity, regain the same aft-
er his fraudulent purpose has been accomplished. And 
this rule applies not only to him, but to his heirs and 
assigns. There is nothing in this record upon which to 
base the claim that by the deeds a trust relation was 
created between the parties. The purpose, as we have 
already said, was to place the title beyond the reach 
of the wife of the grantor, and no trust was or could 
be thereby created." (Emphasis supplied.) 
It seems clear from the foregoing authorities that un-
der the circumstances of this case no trust in favor of 
Greener could be impressed upon the funds. This would 
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seem logically to follow also under the provisions of Sec. 
33-1-11, U. C. A., 1943, which provides as follows: 
"All deeds, gifts, conveyances, transfers or assign-
ments, verbal or written, of goods, chattels, or things 
in action made in trust for the use of the person making 
the same shall be void as against the existing or subse-
quent creditors of such person." 
If Greener, himself, could not make a transfer of the 
funds to Aften in trust for himself, under the statute, how 
then could the lower court under the circumstances impose 
the trust? 
We submit that the judgment below is erroneous in this 
respect. 
VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO PRE-
l\1:ARITAL AGREEMENT WAS ENTERED INTO BE-
TWEEN PLAiNTIFF AND DEFENDANT THOMAS 
RICHARDSON GREENER, IN FORM AS REQUIRED BY 
LAW (33-5-4 SUBSECTION 3, UTAH CODE ANNOTA-
TED, 1943). 
We doubt, except for historical purposes, whether this 
finding of the court is pertinent to this case in view of the 
divorce settlement and the subsequent agreement between 
plaintiff and Greener upon their resumption of marital re-
lations. However, the reason for the failure of the court 
to make a finding as to any agreement between the said 
parties upon resumption of marital relations may lie in this 
finding. We believe the same principles apply. 
The court held as a part of this finding "That prior to 
the marriage of plaintiff and defendant in defendant's court-
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ship of the plaintiff, he told her of his property, and made 
some offers and promises respecting it . . " Just 
what those promises were, the court fails to find, apparent-
ly under the view that because the offers and promises were 
not in writing they were void under the statute of frauds 
enumerated and consequently of no effect in this suit. 
The court committed error in two respects in this find-
ing (1) for the reason that the statute of frauds was not 
pleaded in the answer of the defendants, and (2) the promi-
ses or agreements became executed and thus taken out of 
the statute, upon the marriage of the parties in the first in-
stance and in the second instance, when the parties resumed 
marital relations subsequent to the time the divorce was set 
aside. 
The rule as to the necessity for pleading the statute of 
frauds is tersely stated and settled in this state in the early 
opinion of this Court in Abba v. Smyth, 21 U, 109, as fol-
lows (pp. 118-120): 
"Upon an examination of the answer it will appear 
that no issue under the statute of frauds was raised 
therein. The statute of frauds was not plead, nor was 
any defense such as was interposed at the trial set out. 
So far as appears, the plaintiff had no notice of the de-
fense that was interposed until the trial had com-
menced. • * * 
The plea of the statute of frauds is a personal pri-
vilege which a party may waive, and by failing to spe-
cifically plead it as a defense, defendant could not aft-
erward avail himself of its benefits. This is the general 
and approved rule. Wilson v. Sullivan, 17 Utah 341; 
Lauer v. Richmond, Co-op. Inst., 8 Utah, 305; Wood on 
the Statute of Frauds, Sec. 538; 9 Enc. of Pl. & Pr., pp. 
705, 713, and cases cited; Gill v. Clement, 59 Mo. App. 
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484; Muldoon, et al., v. Brown, et at., 59 Pac. 720; 21 
Utah 121. 
"If the defendant admits the contract, he must 
still interpose the defense of the statute of frauds in 
his answer, in order to make it available in his defense. 
Maybee v. Moore, 90 Mo., 343; 9 Enc. of Pl. & Pr., p. 
713, and cases cited; Iverson v. Cirkel, 56 Minn., 299; 
Connor v. lfingtgen, 19 Neb., 472; Ashmore v. Evans, 
11 N. J. E., 151; Duffy v. O'Donovan, 46 N. Y., 223; 
Barrett v. ~lcAllister, 33 West Va., 738," 
Cf. Utah Mercur Gold Min. co. v. Herschel Gold Min. 
Co., 103 U. 249, 134 P. 2d 1094 and Cardon v. Ha.rper, 106 
U. 560, 151 P. 2d 99. 
The statute of frauds has no application to oral con-
tracts that have been fully executed. Greenwood v. Jack-
son, 102 U. 161, 128 P. 2d 282; Frick v. Rockwell City Can-
ning Co., 192 Iowa 11, 181 N. W. 475; Besse v. McHenry, 89 
Mont. 520, 300 P. 199; Tabola v. Wholey (Cal.) 170 P. 2d. 
952, 956. 
It is difficult to understand how the court below fell 
into error in this finding, particularly when the plea of the 
statute was not set forth in the answer because that same 
issue was before the court but a short time previously in 
Harris v. Wilstead, now on appeal to this Court. In the 
court's opinion in that case (R, 15) the court held that the 
statute of frauds was not available as a defense because it 
was not pleaded. 
VIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT 
PLAINTIFF AND GREENER ENTERED INTO AN 
.ORA.L AGREEMENT IN CONSIDERATION OF THE 
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SETTING ASIDE OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE, 
WHICH AGREEMENT WAS FURTHER CONSUMMA-
TED BY THE SIGNING OF CERTAIN WRITTEN 
AGREEMENTS, WHEREBY THE PLAINTIFF BECAME 
THE OWNER AS JOINT TENANT WITH GREENER ON 
AND AFTER ABOUT APRIL 16, 1947, OF FUNDS 
THJERETOFORE ON DEPOSIT WITH CERTAIN DE-
POSITORIES TO THE SOLE AND SEPARATE AC-
COUNT OF GREENER 
IX 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFEND-
ANT THOMAS RICHARDSON GREENER IS THE SOLE , 
OWNER OF THE FUNDS NOW IN THE CUSTODY OF 
THE COURT. 
Mrs. Rowland, the sister-in-law of plaintiff, testified· 
that when Greener first came to her and inquired of her 
whether she thought the plaintiff would marry him, he 
held out to her that he was an individual of substantial 
means, even to the extent that some people thoughthe was 
worth forty thousand dollars. Hle denied he had that much, 
but he assured her that he had enough to keep the plain-
tiff the rest of her days and she would never have. to go 
on old age pension. He returned the following morning 
and said to her, "Mrs. Rowland, you can make that as big 
as you want, and I will make it good." ('fr. 5-6). 
Mrs. Rowland conveyed the information to the plain-
tiff, who told her to tell Greener to do his own courting. 
That very night Greener called on plaintiff-object, matri-
mony. That same evening he told her that if she would 
have him he had plenty of money to keep her on and that 
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she could have the money. He also told her that he had 
thirty thousand dollars in money, two thousand dollars in 
bonds, five hundred dollars his son owed him and another 
five hundred dollars two grandsons owed him. He told her 
she "could have all that and everything he had, and the old 
man thrown in with it, if she would have him" (Tr. 13). 
After that conversation Greener visited her every day, 
and in the conversations that ensued he made the same 
promises over and over again (Tr. 14). Plaintiff told Green-
er she would have to wait and see whether she wanted to 
get married or not. In about two weeks she made up her 
mind and told him that she would marry him. He reitera-
ted his promises and told plaintiff they would go to Salt 
Lake City and Provo and have her name put on the bank 
books "so that she would be just as much owner of the mon-
ey as he was." 
After their marriage they visited the various deposi-
tories and entered into the several agreements that have 
been received in evidence as Exhibits A, B, C, D, and I. 
Subsequently, upon the granting of the divorce and 
property settlement, the parties again went to the deposi-
tories and had the plaintiff's name removed from the agree-
ments and accounts. 
In about a week's time Greener was back importuning 
the plaintiff to return to him and making the promises over 
and over again, that if she would return to him she could 
have all the money, everything he had and the old man 
thrown in. He appealed to members of her family to put 
in a good word for him, and at least on one occasion in the 
presence of plaintiff's daughter-in-law, Leora Ostler, re· 
iterated the promise that if plaintiff would return to him 
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"he would give her all his property and all his money and 
the old man throwed in" (Tr. 63). 
On the strength of these promises, plaintiff agreed· to 
return to Greener, joined with him in a motion to set aside 
the decree, and thereafter went with him to the various de-
positories and entered into the several agreements of which 
Exhibits E, F, G, H, and I are true copies. 
The plaintiff "would not have gone back to Mr. Green-
er at that time if he had not made these promises with re-
spect to this money ._~~~t was on deposit in the bank, and 
his propertyH· ( Tr. 23) . 
Greener has o..:- cours~ denied making such promises, 
but we submit thm: in view of the impeachment of his 
testimony in other respects, as hereinbefore shown, the 
fact that Leora Ostler corroborated the testimony of the 
plaintiff in this regard, and for other reasons, the denial 
of Greener is unworthy of belief. We point out here the 
making of promises as broad as those above when he tes-
tified (and the court found, R, 150) that at the time she· 
left him last time he told her he "would give her· every-
thing she wanted if she would stay" (Tr. 146, 149). 
"Everything she wanted" might well include "all his 
property, and all his money, and the old man throwed in." 
As a consequence of the promises made by Greener to 
the plaintiff, her acceptance of them, the setting aside of 
the decree of divorce, and her return to the marital status, 
what are plaintiff's rights in and to the· property involved? 
In the light of the specific promises· made by Greener, 
and the acceptance of the promises' by the plaintiff and . her 
return to him after the divorce,· on the strength of those 
promises, we b~lieve the record would justify the conclu-
sion that plaintiff owns the entire funds involved in this 
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suit. However, there seem to be instances in the testimony 
of the plaintiff, as well as Greener, which would indicate 
that nothing more than a present joint interest in the funds, 
with the light of survivorship, was contemplated py the 
parties. We .believe. the record shows conclusively at least 
that. 
Plaintiff, therefore, claims to be entitled to one-half 
of the funds that were in the depositories to the credit ·of 
Greener and her, as joint tenants, on and before December 
22, 1947, to-wit, one-half of $19,879.27, or $9,939.63. She 
also claims that the remainder of said funds are charged 
with a trust ·for her benefit for two purposes: (1) for her 
support and maintenance during her lifetime and costs of 
this suit, and (2) because of her right of survivorship in 
said funds. 
The decisions are legion in the various jurisdictions 
dealing with the rights of parties to funds on deposit in 
joint accounts. Without laboring this brief with the cita-
tions of such cases, we state that in circumstances such as 
are reflected in the instant cause, where parties have en-
tered into an agreement with depositories that the funds 
shall be held in joint tenancy, some courts hold that the 
'agreement is conclusive as to the intention of the parties, 
and that the courts are bound by the agreement, regardless 
of whether the controversy arises during the lives of the 
parties to the agreement or after the death of one of them. 
Tobola v. Wholey, supra. Other courts hold that after the 
death of one of the parties to the joint tenancy, the agree-
ment is conclusive as to the intention of the parties, but 
during the joint lives of the parties only a presumption of 
joint- tenancy exists. The decisions of this Court fall in the 
latter category, as reflected by Holt v. Bayles, 85 U. 364, 
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39 P. 2d. 715, and Neill v. Royce, 101 U. 181, 120 P. 2d. 327, 
where the cases are cited at length and the whole question 
is reviewed exhaustively. 
These two cases were cited and relied upon by the low-
er court as the basis for its decision that Greener was the 
sole owner of the funds in controversy (R, 117-118). We 
believe the court misinterpreted the Neill case and, further-
more, failed to take into account certain testimony of the 
parties which would, beyond question, require a contrary 
result. 
If, as the court below did, we disregard entirely the 
testimony of the plaintiff and her daughter-in-law, and con-
sider only the testimony of Greener, and that only in one 
respect (that the only reason for having plaintiff made a 
party to the joint tenancy agreements was to avoid pro-
bate), then we have a case at least as strong as, if not 
stronger than, that presented in the Neill case by that 
plaintiff. In that case the plaintiff seemed to rely solely 
upon the joint tenancy agreement as establishing the joint 
ownership of the defendant in the funds out of which plain-
. tiff was seeking to recover support money for her and de-
fendant's children. Both the defendant and the intervenor 
(his second wife )testified that the funds belonged to the 
intervenor, and that the only reason that the funds were 
deposited in the joint savings account, rather than in an 
account in intervenor's name alone, was that in case of her 
death the money would be immediately available for the 
education of her children by a former marriage, without 
the cost and trouble of probate. This is essentially the gist 
of Greener's testimony as to the purpose of placing the 
plaintiff's name on the joint accounts, for he testified the 
only reason was, "Should I drop off at any time, and some-
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body's name wasn't on there, it would have to go into the 
probate court and be used up in the probate court, lawyers 
and the court, so that I told her that I put her name on for 
the purpose" (Tr. 122). Other testimony in the Neill case 
by the parties to the joint savings account was to the ef-
fect" that the money was intended to be the sole and sepa-
rate property of the intervenor." Yet, in the face of such 
testimony on the part of both parties to the agreement, 
which is. certainly stronger than the evidence of Greener 
in this case, this Court held that, "Such proof under the 
circumstances of this case cannot be termed so clear and 
convincing as to require the trial court to find in favor of 
appellant." 
In the instant case, the lower court argues in its opin-
ion that, because the plaintiff accepted $2,000 in settlement 
of property rights at the time of the divorce, and never 
dr~w against any of the funds to provide her with neces-
saries and to repay Greener the $2,000, of which he accused 
her of robbing him, and over which there was constant 
quarreling, she has failed to make out her case. 
The court asks several questions, attempts to answer 
them, and then concludes from the pleadings and testimony 
of the plaintiff herself "that she had no such understanding 
[that she had a present interest in the funds], and where 
the true purpose is testified to by the defendant with no 
impeachment* that the intention of the parties was that 
her rights should arise at his death, it appears that the 
*We shall show later that, in addition to the testimony 
of at least one other witness, Greener has himself im-
peached his own testimony in this regard. 
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standard of clarity and certainty has been met and the pre ... 
sumption of the agreements between the parties and the 
depositories overcome.'' 
If this Court had followed any such rule as this, then 
we submit that it could not have arrived at the result that 
it did in the Neill case. As we read the opinion in that case 
there was no impeachment of the testimony of either the 
defendant or int8rvenor. Both of them testified (as only 
one party to the agreements did in the instant case) that 
their intention was only to take advantage of the survivor-
ship provision, and that the money was intended to be the 
sole and separate property of the intervenor; yet this Court 
held that the provisions of the joint tenancy agreement 
should prevail over such testimony. In the instant case, 
to say the least, there is a conflict between the testimony 
of the parties to the agreement, which is all the more 
reason why the plaintiff should prevail in view of Greener's 
burden to overcome the presumption established by the 
agreements, "by clear and convincing proof to the con-
trary." 
The court below asks whether if plaintiff "had acquired 
a present joint title with defendant in all of these funds, 
would she have endured his alleged stinginess? Would she 
have asked him for every penny? Would she have bought 
only one pair of stockings and one underslip during _their 
whole marriage?" To the court, the answer seemed obvi-
ous that if plaintiff had known that the accounts were hers 
as much as Greener's, she would have bought what she 
wanted. 
It is odd that the court should premise its question 
and make its answer on the basis of facts which the court 
later in its opinion finds never existed. If the facts did not 
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exist, then obviously there never was need for the plain-
tiff to draw against the funds, even under the court's rea-
soning. What the court does, therefore, is to presume the 
existence of the facts and then presume the result-pre-
sumption based upon presumption. Presumption. may not 
be pyramided on presumption, nor inference on inference. 
Neel v. Henne (Wash.) 190 P. 2d 775; 22 C. J. pp. 84-85; 
Manning v. John Hancock, etc., 100 U. S. 693; United S1a.tes 
v. Ross, 92 U. S. 28. 
Continuing, the court asks the question "assuming that 
[quarreling and bickering over the $2,000 settlement] to be 
true, would she have endured it knowing that she had the 
present right to draw the $2,000 from one of the deposi-
tories and give it to him"? We are reluctant to ever so 
characterize a question or statement of any court, but in 
our opinion this question is ridiculous, and indicates very 
little understanding on the part of the court of the imme-
diate problem involved. If the quarreling and bickering 
over the money existed (which of course we believe has 
been established beyond doubt), how in the world could this 
plaintiff expect to bring about peace and tranquility by 
withdrawing two thousand dollars out of the joint account 
and giving it to Greener so that he could put it back into 
the joint account, or even in a separate account, for that 
matter? The answer in this instance is obvious. 
The court then asks whether the plaintiff would have 
accepted $2,000 in full settlement of all property rights 
upon the divorce if she were entitled to joint ownership with 
Greener in the funds that approached $30,000. The ans-
-wers to this question may be thousand-fold. The record 
does not give the answer. Plaintiff was not questioned in 
this regard. We do not think it is necessarily material, and 
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disagree with the court's reasoning that the situation now 
existing is necessarily and essentially the same as when the 
settlement was made. But if it is, the answers may still 
be legion. It might be suggested that plaintiff was not 
properly represented at that time, and that counsel who 
represented her in name were actually and in fact more 
interested in looking out for Greener, whose counsel they 
are in the instant suit. It might be suggested that plaintiff 
"leaned over backwards" to please Greener-she was doing 
that by getting the divorce. Perhaps she felt that she had 
been married to him such a short time that, even though 
she may have had a legal claim to more, she would not in-
sist on her full rights. Whatever the real answer might be, 
certainly it is not necessarily the answer given by the court. 
The foregoing questions posed by the court fall into 
one category, viz., whether the failure of the plaintiff to 
draw on the accounts is a persuasive fact in determining 
the ownership of a joint tenancy. Apparently this Court 
did not think so in the Neill case, because there, although 
the defendant came up with $500 obtained from the joint 
savings accotmt, it is not shown that it was withdrawn by 
him, or that he ever made any withdrawals from the ac~ 
count. Cf. Beach v. Holland (Ore.) 142 P. 2d. 990. 
X 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
SOLE PUR)POSE AND INTENTION OF THE PLAIN-
TIFF AND GREENER IN PLACING THE PLAINTIFF'S 
NAME ON THE VARIOUS AGREEMENTS AND BANK 
BOOKS OF TH\E DEPOSITORIES WAS TO A VOID PRO-
BATE, AND NEITHER OF THEM AT ANY TIME, CON-
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SIDERED THAT THE PLAINTIFF OWNED ANY PRE-
SENT INTEREST IN SAID FUNDS. 
We challenge the above finding, as well as the state-
ment in the court's opinion to the effect that the true pur-
pose, as testified to by Greener, with no impeachment, was 
that the intention of the parties was that plaintiff's rights 
should arise at Greener's death. 
Plaintiff testified that Greener told her one day that 
she was crazy that she didn't write out some checks and 
get some of the money (Tr. 35). 
Greener testified on cross examination as follows (Tr. 
146): 
· "Q. Now you knew at the time you and Mrs. Greener 
were on these accounts in these institutions in Salt Lake 
that both of you could draw on those accounts, that was 
your understanding? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And there was no limitation upon either one of 
you going into the banks and drawing? 
A. No sir; got to have the books to do it. 
Q. You never imposed any limitations on it what-
ever, did you? 
A. No, I didn't object to it at all." 
And on direct examination (Tr. 158-159): 
"Q. Did you ever have any intention at any time that 
lVIrs. Greener, the present plaintiff, should ever ~ave any of 
that money as her own during your .lifetime? 
A. Yes, provided she fulfilled her part of the agree-
ment. 
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Q. Now what do you mean by that? 
A. When she come back to me I asked her what she 
was going to do. And she said she was going to prove to 
me she was a real wife this time and fulfill all her promi-
ses and make me happy. And that's what she had to do to 
get it. 
Q. And is that all? 
A. Well, a good many other promises she made be-
fore I took her back." 
And again, on cross examination: 
"Q. So that on those promises you took her back and 
you went to Salt Lake and signed these contracts and she 
became part owner of the funds with you, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it was such that you intended at that time? 
A. Yes." 
On the hearing on the first order to show cause, Green-
er testified as follows (Tr. 201-202): 
"Q. Now, prior to the time of your divorce Mrs. 
Greener was a joint owner of the bank accounts with you, 
wasn't she? 
A. She is what? 
Q. She was on the bank accounts, you each had the 
right to draw checks against the account? 
er. 
A. There was Thomas R. Greener, or Amy E. Green-
Q. Yes. And that is your wife. 
A. Yes. 
Q. That was before the divorce, wasn't it? 
A. That is the way it stood all the time. 
"" * • • 
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Q. Mrs. Greener had access to the bank books all the 
time before the time you drew out the money, didn't she? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Same as you had? 
A. Yes." 
The foregoing testimony from the mouth of Greener, 
we submit, is eloquent denial of his other statement (which 
the court took to the exclusion of all others) to the effect 
that the intention of the parties was that plaintiff's right 
should arise at his death. 
What stronger statement does a court require to prove 
present interest than the above; particularly Greener's 
statement that when the parties signed the contracts Mrs. 
Greener became part o\vner of the funds with him and ht: 
intended such at the time? 
In the light of this testimony, we submit that Greener 
cannot. possibly meet the burden of proof required by this 
Court in the Neill case, but, on the other hand, plaintiff, 
with the very able assistance of Greener, has proved a 
present ownership in the funds beyond any peradventure 
of doubt. The extent of that ownership is established by 
the joint tenancy agreements, admitted in evidence, as one-
half of the whole. Cf. State Board of Equalization v. Cole 
(1\tlont.) 195 P. 2d 989, 994. 
We submit, therefore, that the court ererd in making 
the finding set forth in the heading of this section of this 
brief, and in failing to find that the plaintiff owns and has 
a present interest in the funds, now in the hands of the 
Clerk of the Court, by reason of the several agreements 
entered into between the plaintiff and Greener and between 
plaintiff, Greener and the various depositories. 
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We submit also that the court erred in failing to award 
to plaintiff as her sole property one-half of the funds that 
were on deposit on December 22, 1947. Cf. Nusshold v. 
Kruschke (Ore.) 159 P. 2d 819. 
XI 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IMPRESS A 
TRUST ON THAT PORTION OF THE FUNDS REMAIN-
ING AFTER DEDUCTION OF PLAINTIFF'S ONE-HALF 
INTEREST, FOR HER SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE 
AS WELL AS FOR HER RIGHT OF SURWVORSHIP. 
We have shown in Section I, subsection A, of this brief 
that the transfer of the funds by Greener to Aften Wa.!l 
fraudulent, not only as to plaintiff's one-half interest, but 
to the balance of the fund, as well. We have also shown 
that under such circumstances the plaintiff has demands 
enforceable in equity against that balance for her support 
and maintenance and also to the extent of her right to 
share in the funds upon the decease of Greener, and that 
these demands are a specific charge upon the funds in-
volved.. We have also shown that Greener is entitled to no 
relief under the pleadings, or under the well defined rules 
of equity. We have also shown that a court of equity will 
not lend its aid to establish ? trust in favor of Greener un-
der the circumstances of this case, and that the lower court 
erred in this respect. 
We believe, therefore, that under the pleadings and the 
law, plaintiff is the only person who now has a legitimate 
claim to any part of the funds. We submit that, in addi-
tion to her right to recover her one-half of the fund, as 
shown in the next preceding section, a trust in her favor 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
56 
should be impressed upon the balance of the funds for her 
support and maintenance, her costs in connection with this 
suit, as well as for her right of survivorship in case Greener 
predeceases her. 
XII 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAIN-
TIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A'ITORNEYS' FEES OR 
COSTS AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BEAR 
HER OWN EXPENSES. 
We submit that the court erred in denying plaintiff 
counsel fees and costs. 
The record shows that plaintiff has no means by which 
she can pay her attorneys' fees. We submit the record it-
self as to the vast amount of work performed by counsel, 
first, in locating the funds involved; second, in bringing 
them under the jurisdiction of the court, and, finally, in the 
trial of the case on its merits. We urge on this Court that 
the sum of $350.00 would be a very modest fee for coun-
sels' services up to and including the entry of judgment be-
low. 
Upon the stipulation of counsel for the parties that the 
sum of $1,000.00 is a reasonable sum for the servi~es ~f 
plaintiff's counsel on appeal, pursuant to plaintiff's motion 
for such allowance, the court below allowed only the sum 
of $600.00, payable in certain installments (R, 165-166). 
We submit that plaintiff should be awarded the additional 
sum of $400.00 as and for attorneys' fees on this appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we submit to the Court that the record 
is devoid of any specific instances of misconduct upon the 
part of the plaintiff. She comes into court with "clean 
hands," to protect her property rights and to be freed from 
the husband who has attempted to defraud her, and whose 
conduct toward her makes it impossible for the marital 
status to continue. She is entitled to the aid of a court of 
equity. 
On the other hand, the "clean hands" rule, which is 
"the most important rule affecting the administration of 
justice" (Katz v. Karlsson, (Cal.) 191 P. 2d 541), denies 
either defendant any relief in this cause. 
We respectfully submit that the plaintiff is entitled to 
a divorce from Greener upon the grounds alleged and 
proved herein and to attorneys' fees in connection there-
with; that in connection with the divorce she is entitled to 
a reasonable provision for her support and maintenance 
out of the balance of funds now in court custody after the 
allotment to her of her one-half interest therein; that irre-
spective of whether she is granted a divorce, she is entitled 
to one-half of the fund, and to support, maintenance, coun-
sel fees, and to her right of survivorship out of the balance 
of said funds, and that a trust for such purposes should be 
impressed upon the balance of such funds. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SANDGREN AND BLACKHAM, 
S. E. BLACKHAM, 
CLYDE D. SANDGREN, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
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